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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1976 
___________ 
 
ROBERT WASHINGTON, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, HOMICIDE UNIT, SUPERVISORS 
AUTHORITY OFFICIALS, JOHN DOE; OFFICER ROCKS; OFFICER EDWARD J. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil No. 2-13-cv-00897) 
District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)  
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 11, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 22, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Robert Washington is a Pennsylvania prisoner. In March 2013, he commenced this 
civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging: (1) in November 2003, he was 
wrongfully arrested pursuant to a warrant, taken into custody, and charged with murder, 
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robbery, and several related crimes; (2) at the time, he was a minor with a long history of 
drug abuse and a learning disability; (3) he was not administered Miranda warnings; (4) 
following his arrest, he was harassed, threatened, coerced, tricked, and interrogated 
outside the presence of his legal guardians and without the benefit of an attorney; and (5) 
eventually, counsel was appointed, but counsel conspired with the prosecutor and coerced 
him into pleading guilty to all charges. He claimed mental anguish, shock, 
embarrassment, slander, libel, and humiliation, as well as violations of his procedural and 
substantive due process rights under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. According to Washington, he was unable to file this action 
previously due to several extraordinary and special circumstances, including his minority, 
his incompetence, psychotropic medication, and the conditions of his confinement. He 
sought damages and a declaratory judgment acknowledging the multiple violations of his 
due process rights. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The District Court 
concluded that: (1) Washington’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 
486-87 (1994) (to recover damages, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that his conviction or 
sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into 
question), see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (absent prior 
invalidation of conviction of sentence, § 1983 action is barred, regardless of remedy 
sought); (2) to the extent his Fourth Amendment claims were not barred by Heck, see 
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 395 n.5 (2007), they were time-barred by Pennsylvania’s 
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two-year statute of limitations, see Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; 
(3) Washington was not entitled to tolling sufficient to maintain his complaint, noting that 
he had filed habeas petitions in 2007 and 2009, asserting similar claims, see Staehr v. 
Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the 
court may take judicial notice of prior lawsuits); and (4) amendment of his complaint 
would be futile, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Washington appeals pro se. Because we granted him leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis, we must screen this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine 
whether it should be dismissed as frivolous. An appeal is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable 
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). We 
conclude that there is no arguable basis to challenge the District Court’s decision to 
dismiss Washington’s complaint for the reasons set forth in its memorandum. We also 
agree that amendment of his complaint would be futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. 
Accordingly, we will dismiss this appeal as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
